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Does Time Really Slow Down during a Frightening
Event?
Chess Stetson1,2, Matthew P. Fiesta2, David M. Eagleman3,4*
1California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, United States of America, 2Department of Neurobiology and Anatomy, The University of
Texas Medical School at Houston, Houston, Texas, United States of America, 3Department of Neuroscience, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston,
Texas, United States of America, 4Department of Psychiatry, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas, United States of America
Observers commonly report that time seems to have moved in slow motion during a life-threatening event. It is unknown
whether this is a function of increased time resolution during the event, or instead an illusion of remembering an emotionally
salient event. Using a hand-held device to measure speed of visual perception, participants experienced free fall for 31 m
before landing safely in a net. We found no evidence of increased temporal resolution, in apparent conflict with the fact that
participants retrospectively estimated their own fall to last 36% longer than others’ falls. The duration dilation during a
frightening event, and the lack of concomitant increase in temporal resolution, indicate that subjective time is not a single
entity that speeds or slows, but instead is composed of separable subcomponents. Our findings suggest that time-slowing is a
function of recollection, not perception: a richer encoding of memory may cause a salient event to appear, retrospectively, as
though it lasted longer.
Citation: Stetson C, Fiesta MP, Eagleman DM (2007) Does Time Really Slow Down during a Frightening Event? PLoS ONE 2(12): e1295. doi:10.1371/
journal.pone.0001295
INTRODUCTION
Temporal judgments – such as duration, order, and simultaneity –
are subject to distortions [1]. For example, perceived durations can
be warped by saccades [2,3] or by an oddball in a sequence [4].
Temporal order judgments of actions and sensations can be
illusorily reversed by exposure to delayed motor consequences [5],
and simultaneity judgments can be manipulated by repeated
exposure to non-simultaneous stimuli [6]. Distortions in interval
timing can be induced by narcotics such as cocaine and marijuana
[7], as well as by disorders such as schizophrenia [8] and
Parkinson’s disease [9].
However, an open question is whether subjective time is a unitary
phenomenon, or instead whether it is underpinned by separate neural
mechanisms that usually work in concert but can be dissociated under
the right circumstances. In other words, when one temporal
judgment changes, do the others necessarily follow suit?
To address this question, we turned to the common anecdotal
report that time seems to have slowed down during a life-threatening
situation (such as a car accident). The experimental question, for the
present purposes, is what it might mean for ‘time’ to move in slow
motion. If time as a single unified entity can slow down – the way it
does in movies – then this slow motion should entail consequences
such as an ability to perceive events with higher temporal resolution.
For example, watching a hummingbird in video slow motion allows
finer temporal discrimination upon replay at normal speed because
more snapshots are taken of the rapidly beating wings. To test
whether humans experience increased temporal resolution during
frightening events, we designed an experiment in which participants
could accurately detect a visual stimulus only if they were
experiencing supra-normal temporal resolution.
METHODS
We leveraged the fact that the visual brain integrates over a small
window of time. If two or more stimuli arrive within a single
window of integration (usually ,80 msec), they are perceived as a
single stimulus [10]. As an illustration of this principle, a child’s toy
known as a thaumatrope has, for example, a picture of a bird on
one side of a disc and a picture of a tree branch on the other; when
the disc is wound up and spun quickly so that both sides are seen in
rapid alternation, the bird appears to be resting on the branch.
Because the stimuli are alternating so rapidly that the visual system
cannot distinguish them temporally; they are seen as though
simultaneously present.
We applied this characteristic of the visual system to the
perception of rapidly alternating digits. When shown a digit and its
negative image at a slow rate of alternation (Fig. 1a), participants
have no trouble identifying it. As the rate of alternation increases,
a sharp threshold is reached after which the information is
presented too rapidly and the digit can no longer be discriminated
from a uniform display (Fig. 1b) – that is, at a high rate of
alternation the images perceptually overlap as though they were
presented simultaneously.
Using this technique of rapid alternation, we were able to measure
a participant’s temporal threshold both before and during a
frightening event to determine if there was any change in resolution.
We engineered a portable device (the ‘‘perceptual chronometer’’,
Fig. 1c) which contains 2 LED arrays and a programmable
microchip that presents randomized digital numbers and their
negatives at adjustable rates. Participants watched a briefly presented
(,2 sec), rapidly alternating pair of digits on the perceptual
chronometer, and, for different alternation frequencies, attempted
to verbally report the digits they perceived. The temporal resolution
of the viewer determined whether the digits were identifiable or not.
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To establish temporal thresholds, each participant was asked to
report the numbers shown on the device, starting with a slow
repetition frequency. Upon correct digit identification, we random-
ized the digits and increased the alternation frequency by decreasing
the period 6 ms. The threshold was identified as the frequency at
which a participant was unable to correctly identify randomized
numbers after 3 consecutive presentations. We tested 13 participants
during the daytime and 7 at nighttime and found average threshold
periods of 47.4613 ms and 33.469 ms, respectively.
After obtaining thresholds, we harnessed participants safely to a
platform which was then winched 46 m off the ground to the apex of
a Suspended Catch Air Device (SCAD) tower (Fig. 1d). The
chronometer was strapped to the participant’s forearm like a
wristwatch, and was programmed to display a random number
alternating at a period 6 ms faster than their determined threshold.
Participants were released from the top of the tower and experienced
free fall for 2.49 s before landing safely in a net. During the fall, they
attempted to read the digits for subsequent report. If higher temporal
resolution were experienced during the freefall, the alternation rate
should appear slowed, thus allowing for the accurate reporting of
numbers that would otherwise be unreadable.
One of the two experimenters remained on the platform to
monitor for eye closure. One participant who closed her eyes for
the entire free fall was excluded from the study; all others kept
their eyes open during at least part of the freefall.
Upon landing in the net, participants verbally reported the
displayed number; if they were unsure, they were asked to deliver
their best guess. The displayed number was verified by the
experimenters by slowing the display to an easily readable
alternation rate, and answers were scored for accuracy (correct
reporting of both digits = 100%, one digit = 50%, neither = 0%).
Additionally, 7 participants made duration judgments. After
watching another participant take the freefall, but before they took
the freefall themselves, we asked these participants to imagine
being released from the top and then falling through the air until
they hit the net. At the moment when they pictured their release
from the top, they were to press the start button on a stopwatch; at
the time that they imagined hitting the net, they were to press the
stop button. We repeated the same measurement just after they
experienced the free fall themselves, this time asking them to
remember being released from the top and estimate how long it
took until they hit the net.
To avoid incentivization, participants were not compensated
except for the cost of the SCAD dive. All participants gave written
informed consent as approved by the IRB at the University of
Texas, Houston Medical School.
Figure 1. Measuring temporal resolution during a fearful event. (a)
When a digit is alternated slowly with its negative image, it is easy to
identify. (b) As the rate of alternation speeds, the patterns fuse into a
uniform field, indistinguishable from any other digit and its negative. (c)
The perceptual chronometer is engineered to display digits defined by
rapidly alternating LED lights on two 868 arrays. The internal
microprocessor randomizes the digits and can display them adjustably
from 1–166 Hz. (d) The Suspended Catch Air Device (SCAD) diving
tower at the Zero Gravity amusement park in Dallas, Texas (www.go-
jump.com). Participants are released from the apex of the tower and fall
backward for 31 m before landing safely in a net below.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001295.g001
Figure 2. No evidence for fear-induced increase in temporal
resolution. (a) Participants’ estimates of the duration of the free-fall
were expanded by 36%. The actual duration of the fall was 2.49 sec. (b)
If a duration expansion of 36% caused a corresponding increase in
temporal resolution, a 79% accuracy in digit identification during the
fall would be predicted (left bar, see text). However, participants’
accuracy in-flight was significantly less than expected based on this
theory (middle bar, p,261026). In-flight performance was no better
than ground-based controls (right bar, p = 0.86), in which the
experimental sequence was identical except that the participants did
not perform the free fall. The performance scores are averaged over
participants, each of whom performed the experiment only once and
had a potential performance of 100% (correctly reported both digits),
50%, or 0%. Note that participants did show better-than-chance
performance on both the in-flight experiment and ground-based
control (chance = 10% accuracy) even though the alternation period
had been set to 6 ms below their threshold. This performance gain
might be attributable to perceptual learning; it may also be because
movement of the chronometer makes it slightly easier to read due to
separation of successive frames, and participants sometimes moved the
device involuntarily as they hit the net. To ensure parity between the
comparisons, we applied a small jerk to control participants’ wrists to
mimic how the device moved when free-fall participants hit the net.
Asterisks represent p,0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001295.g002
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RESULTS
Using the retrospective stopwatch estimation, participants’ dura-
tion estimates increased by an average of 36% when they recalled
their own fall (from 2.1760.24 s to 2.9660.51 s, p,0.03, paired t-
test, one-tailed, Fig. 2a), consistent with their verbal report that
their fall had ‘‘seemed to take a very long time’’.
But was there a concomitant increase in temporal resolution?
For a flickering display such as the one in this experiment,
participants typically exhibit a sharp threshold between frame
rates at which they can perceive the stimulus, and frame rates at
which they cannot (around 3 ms, determined in a separate
experiment). Therefore, we would expect that when measuring
near their baseline threshold, a small increase in a participants’
temporal resolution would translate into a large increase in
perceptual performance. By fitting a psychometric curve to
participants’ pre-jump data, and then shifting it by the amount
predicted by a 36% speed-up of their temporal resolution, we
obtained an estimate of the perceptual performance we might
expect during the free fall. The mean expected performance
(measured as correct digit identification) is plotted in Figure 2b,
along with the actual performance. In a control experiment, we
repeated the experimental procedure, but participants remained
on the ground. The mean in-flight performance was much less
than what we predicted, and no different from the ground-based
control (p = 0.98). Thus, while duration estimates increase during a
high-fear situation (Fig. 2a), the lack of a matching increase in
perceptual performance (Fig. 2b) indicates that duration estimates
are not directly linked to temporal resolution.
DISCUSSION
We have tested whether the subjective duration increase of a
frightening event is due to increased temporal resolution (as from
the speeding of a camera) or instead whether duration distortions
do not necessarily entail the expected consequences of a unitary
time slowing down. Understanding how and why duration
estimations change constrains neural models of time representa-
tion, some of which are turning to the question of whether the
representation of time can speed or slow [1,11,12].
Participants free-falling from 50 meters experienced a duration
expansion, yet they did not gain increased discrimination
capacities in the time domain. This finding supports the hypothesis
that subjective time is not unitary, and is consistent with the
finding that flicker rates and the pitches of sounds do not lower
during subjective duration dilations [13], as would be expected
during slow motion in movies.
A critical point for the logic of this study is that flicker fusion
frequencies are not limited by the retina, since retinal ganglion
cells have extremely high temporal resolution. For example, in cat
retinal ganglion cells, temporal resolution is ,95 Hz for X cells
and ,120 Hz for Y cells under photopic illumination [14]. In
primates, neurons in temporal cortex are able to temporally follow
complex stimuli presented at 72 Hz [15]. Additionally, given the
effect of many medications on the psychophysical flicker fusion
frequency [16], it is clear that the limits of temporal resolution are
central, not peripheral.
Therefore, at this stage there is no evidence to support the
hypothesis that subjective time as a whole runs in slow motion
during frightening events. Rather, we speculate that the involve-
ment of the amygdala in emotional memory may lead to dilated
duration judgments retrospectively, due to a richer, and perhaps
secondary encoding of the memories [17–20]. Upon later readout,
such highly salient events may be erroneously interpreted to have
spanned a greater period of time.
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